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Comments on Professor Burbank's
Essay
By BRADLEY C. CANON*
Professor Stephen Burbank's Essay, Alternative CareerResolution: An Essay on the Removal of FederalJudges, approaches
a problem that is as old as the Constitution: how should federal
judges, believed to be engaged in criminal activity, partial justice,
or simply unable to perform rationally or effectively, be removed
from office or at least from their judicial functions? Although
the question is an old one, it is not a major one as constitutional
issues go.
In the wake of the disputes between President Jefferson and
the Federalists, culminating in Justice Samuel Chase's impeachment and acquittal in 1805, the main parameters of what constitute an impeachable offense have been commonly agreed upon,
Gerald Ford's remark to the contrary notwithstanding. When
the impeachment of Justice William 0. Douglas was discussed
in 1970, Ford, then the minority leader in the House of Representatives, said that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority in the House thinks it is. Nonetheless, when the House of
Representatives has impeached judges, it has been because of
serious breaches of judicial ethics, not on the basis of political
disagreement.
Historically, the great majority of federal judges have been
honest and at least reasonably able; consequently, serious consideration of removing them from their positions has occurred
only very sporadically. The problem of easing out a judge who
has become senile, or otherwise dysfunctional, has generally been
handled informally and usually successfully, although not with-
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out some resistance as the story of Justice Stephen J. Field
illustrates.
Justice Field served on the Supreme Court for almost thirtyfive years (1863-97), holding the record for longevity until Justice
Douglas broke it in 1974. The story is that when Justice Field
became semi-senile, the other members of the Supreme Court
nominated Justice John Marshall Harlan I to approach Field
about retiring. Harlan, knowing that Field had been given the
same task back in 1869 when Justice Robert Grier's mental
powers had waned and knowing that Field had done his job
successfully, sought to disarm the aged Justice with candor. He
aroused the slumbering Field in the robing room and reminded
the old man about how he, Field, had set the stage for Grier's
retirement. Right then, however, Field's mind was in one of its
nimbler states. He became instantly alert and his eyes shone as
he cried out, "Yes! And a dirtier day's work I never did in my
life." So much for Harlan's effort. Even so-to make the pointa year later Field's colleagues were able to persuade him to step
down.'
The number of federal judges has increased dramatically in
recent years. The number is now over 700, compared to under
300 only thirty years ago. Moreover, this number is likely to
grow steadily as more and more laws involve the federal courts
in new types of claims and as more and more inventive lawyers
(or law school professors) devise ways to expand the scope of
existing federal jurisdiction or to get cases into the federal courts.
The inevitable consequence is that the number of judges who
commit crimes or other unseemly acts or who refuse to step
down, despite disabilities, will increase. The cries for removing
a particular judge from office, or at least from the judicial
function, will become more frequent. The pressure will mount
for a more efficient remedy.
It is not too soon to begin thinking about possible solutions.
Certainly Professor Burbank's Essay is a well-reasoned review
to this end. It does not give us a clear answer. Indeed, it raises
more questions than it answers. Nevertheless, if you accept his
basic assumptions, especially his assumption that the indepenI H. ABRAH1m,

JUstiCES AND PSIDMENTS 152-53 (2d ed. 1985).
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dence of the federal judiciary must not be compromised, Professor Burbank's Essay points out the difficulties with some
proposed solutions and, in effect, eliminates them from further
consideration. The Essay also effectively counteracts many of
the constitutional "boogey men" that are raised against some
of the more sensible proposals.
Professor Burbank is especially thorough in refuting the
arguments that impeachment must precede criminal conviction
and that a conviction should be considered a per se ground for
impeachment. He is also wise in arguing against a hasty verdict
on the utility of the 1980 Act. As misfeasance among federal
judges is uncommon, and the Act has been operative for only
six years, it thus has been put to few tests. At this point, it is
simply too early to say how well the Act is working.
Professor Burbank discusses only in passing the solutions
which might be derived from the manner in which states remove
or discipline judges. I believe that some important lessons might
be learned from scrutinizing their experiences. Of course, unlike
federal judges, state judges are subject to some degree of electoral control in four-fifths of the states. 2 Still the vast majority
of these judges are unopposed for re-election, 3 and, in the nineteen merit plan states, judges run only against their own record. 4
Moreover, they serve fairly lengthy terms, ranging mainly from
six to fourteen years at the appellate level. 5 As with the federal
system, most states traditionally used only the impeachment
option, with all of its attendant problems, to remove judges
prior to electoral review.6 In recent years, however, nearly all
states have found it desirable or useful to create new mechanisms
to handle situations in which judges appear to be corrupt, disabled, or given to highly injudicious behavior. 7
H. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 85 (2d ed. 1988).
1 See P. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST
FOR ACCOUNTABILTY (1980).
4 H. GLICK, supra note 2, at 93.
' COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNM!ENTS, BOOK OF THM STATES 1984-1985 146-49 (1984)
[hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES].
6 See H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 127-28 (4th ed. 1984). A few states traditionally removed judges by "legislative address" in which the legislature votes to remove
a judge. Id. at 128.
7 See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 5, at 154-61. Arkansas is now the only
state that relies solely on impeachment for removal of judges. Id. at 156.
2
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In 1960, California established a Commission on Judicial
Performance, which subsequently became the model for similar
commissions in about two-thirds of the states. Th'ese commissions usually consist of a mixture of judges and attorneys and
frequently also include lay persons. They receive complaints
about judges, investigate their validity, may hold public or closed
hearings, and, when warranted, will recommend actions such as
censure, suspension, retirement, or removal. The recommendation almost always goes to the state supreme court, which is
empowered to take final action. 8 When a complaint is lodged
against a supreme court justice, lower court judges, often chosen
by lot, consider the recommendation.9 A somewhat different
mechanism, used in about eight states, is to have a court consider
such complaints directly. A special court consisting of judges
from various levels of the judicial system or the state supreme
court may have this duty.'0
One may argue that these commissions or courts will be
hampered by an inherent reluctance on the part of judges to
curb their errant brethren for many of the same reasons that
physicians are allegedly unwilling to act against their peers. For
this reason, commissions that contain a majority of nonjudges
are probably preferable to commissions or courts composed
solely of judges; however, judges also have a strong stake in
maintaining judicial integrity at a high level of visibility. The
continuation of serious improprieties will diminish the public's
respect for all judges. Perhaps complaints establishing marginal
cases of ethical violations or disabilities may produce censure or
no action rather than removal, but judges are unlikely to tolerate
serious misconduct or misfeasance in office. The commission or
court mechanisms, certainly less dramatic than impeachment,
may also assist in getting judges to leave voluntarily. In California, for example, the commission removed three judges and
censured six in the first seventeen years of operation, but fifty-

'

See P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES 98 (1981). In Tennessee, the recommendation
goes to the legislature. See BooK oF THE STATES, supra note 5, at 161.
9 This can get quite messy. See the account of complaints against several members
of the California Supreme Court in P. STOLZ, supra note 8.
,0 See generally Culver & Cruikshanks, Judicial Misconduct: Bench Behavior and
the New DisciplinaryMechanisms, 2 ST. C. J. 3, 3-6, 30-38 (1978).
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seven judges resigned during the corihmissions investigation."
Certainly the ponderous weapon of impeachment cannot be
brought to bear on the judiciary anywhere near as often.
These self-p licing mechanisms have the advantage of retaiiing judicial independence. Neither the legislative nor the executive branch is involved. Judges need not fear that those in the
political branches, who soon must face the electorate, will seek
their removal for the main offense of rendering an unpopular
decision. While the commission plan provides for infusion from
attorneys and (presumably knowledgeable) laymen, commission
members do not serve at the voters' sufferance and certainly
should appreciate the need for judicial independence., In any
event, eliminating political or ideological bias completely is impossible when one group of persons sits in judgment of another
person who makes public decisions. All we can do is structure
the process to minimize the likelihood of bias. Having judges sit
in judgment of another judge is probably as close as we can
come.
A constitutional amendment will almost certainly be necessary to institute a workable and efficient system of judicial selfpolicing among federal judges. Currently, the only means of
removal now sanctioned by the Constitution is impeachment by
13
the House of Representatives 2 and conviction by the Senate.
Given the constitutional provision that judges shall serve for
"good Behaviour, ' 1 4 any other removal mechanism is immediately constitutionally suspect.
While Professor Burbank stresses the transaction costs of
adopting constitutional amendments, I am not so sure that the
costs will necessarily be all that high. Amendments that essentially involve governmental "housekeeping" provisions can be
adopted with inexpensive transaction costs. This happened in
approving both the twentieth amendment (changing the starting
date for presidential and congressional terms) 5 and the twentyfifth amendment (providing for succession to the presidency and

H. STm1,, AMIcAN JuDIcIAL POLITICS 186 (1988).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 5.
13 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
14 Id. at art. III, § 1.
'1 Id. at amend. XX.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[VoL. 76

the vice-presidency under various conditions).' 6 Both amendments were adopted after the weaknesses of the earlier structures
were "brought home" to political leaders and the public by the
long interregnum between Franklin Roosevelt's election and inauguration as the nation's economy came apart and the need
for more complete succession provisions in the wake of President
Kennedy's assassination.
I cannot confidently say that placing some variety of judicial
self-policing structure into the Constitution will be easy. Indeed,
at the present time, it probably would not be. The difficulties
would not be those that face forces trying to secure the adoption
of amendments that arouse great political or emotional intensity,
such as one prohibiting abortions or a restoration of organized
prayer in the public schools. Rather, they would be the difficulties attendant upon elite and public apathy-a "who cares?,"
"what's the problem?" reaction.
Nevertheless, this indifference may decline, and interest in
easier ways of disciplining federal judges correspondingly may
rise if the 1980 Act does not function well. A few more impeachment trials-or even threats of them-in the next decade or two
may convince Congress that the existing process is too cumbersome and too time-consuming. Similarly if a significant number
of unworthy judges stay on the federal bench because of the
inefficiency of impeachment and the futility of lesser sanctions,
the public may be ready for a change. When and if these occur,
the adoption of a constitutional amendment, changing the process by which federal judges can be removed and disciplined,
may occur with minimal transaction costs. Until then, we must
wait for the 1980 Act to take its course and hope for the best.

16

Id. at amend. XXV.

